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NEW DEPARTURES IN MULTILATERAL TRADE,
DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION: THE LOMI1
CONVENTION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE UNITED
STATES
By

EDWARD

A.

LAING*

On February 28, 1975, the European Economic Community (EEC) and
46 states of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, signed the ACP-EEC
Lom6 Convention at Lom6, the capital of Togo.' The Convention, which
marks the culmination of a series of arrangements commencing in 1957
between the EEC and African territories on trade and aid relationships,
has been hailed as a very significant and an unique instrument. It will now
be discussed in the context of several general trends in multilateral trade,
development and cooperation and an assessment of its impact on the
United States will be made.
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

The Problems Of Trade And Development Of Developing Countries

During the 1960's and 1970's economic problems of the developing countries have become a focal point of much international attention. Regional
and universal organizations and other countries have devoted a considerable amount of time and energy to identifying the multifarious problems
which lie in the way of the objective of making the best and most productive use of resources with a view of improving the lot of mankind. However,
the solutions which have been suggested have either been too vague or have
hardly been implemented - in view of the wide variety of specific
manifestations of the problems and the vast number and diversity of developing countries.
In the specific area of trade and development, some of the many needs
which have been identified are: to increase the receipts from export earnings;2 to eradicate the dependency in trade relations of particular develop*Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Cambridge University (B.A., 1964;
LL.B., 1966); Columbia University (LL.M. 1968).
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance in the preparation of this article furnished
by G.P. Hoadley. Michigan State University (B.A., 1973).
1. Africa-Caribbean-Pacific-European Economic Community Convention of Lom&,
[The Courier, European Community-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific, No. 31 (Special Issue),
March, 1975; reproduced in 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 595 (1975).

2. For example, through improving the terms of trade, developing equitable transportation schemes, and obtaining better prices for commodities or other products of the developing
countries.
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ing countries on particular developed countries and to terminate the economic strangulation of developing countries by the developed world; to
diversify exports and to reform the production patterns3 of the countries
which must, at the same time, obtain new markets and seek rapidly to
assimilate a vast body of techniques and other experience which exist; to
develop viable systems of financing of trade and developing through local
and external channels; and to obtain unrestricted access to and participation in decision-making fora, particularly those which pass upon such matters as the terms of trade and its regulation. In fact, to a large extent, the
problem is seen as being one of transferring the center of gravity in trade
and development matters from the developed to the developing world, or
at least to neutral or representative fora.1
More recently, it has been recognized that many problems which were
not hitherto recognized as economic problems do, in fact, have that nature
and that most of the vast array of international problems are closely interrelated. Today there is a respectable body of opinion that disarmament
should be rapidly accelerated and the resources released by this transferred
to the alleviation of the problems of trade and development; that international monetary problems must be solved with an eye on the needs of the
special problems of developing countries; that the new distribution in the
use of resources should not exclude technology, the benefits of which
should be more easily available to the developing world; that inappropriate
environmental policies seriously affect these countries-arguably even
more than developed countries, the main creators of ecological decay; that
underdevelopment is to a large extent a product of past colonialism, which
is perpetuated by forms of neo-colonialism and the residues of colonialism.5
Highly stimulative of much of this recognition and contribution to the
articulation of many of these problems were the regional Economic Commissions of the United Nations. By 1961, the General Assembly was able
to designate 1961-71 as the "United Nations Development Decade" in a
resolution which, however, was largely hortatory and generally vague in
specific detail., Spurred on by a growing ferment of activity in and discussions among the rapidly growing number of independent developing countries, the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was
3. Usually, serious infrastructural development and social readjustment and improvement are also seemingly desirable or required. Technology, too, must be transferred, with all
the well known problems this brings about.
4. Among the many less general needs and problems which have been identified are those
relating to some countries' demographic features and geographical problems. Also, certain
classes of countries have been identified as having peculiar difficulties, e.g., landlocked countries and island nations. Some countries are now being regarded as being particularly worse
off than all others - the "least developed countries."
5. For example, the so called "dependency syndrome."
6. See General Assembly Resolution 1710 (XVI), 19 December 1961; and General Assembly Resolution 1715 (XVI), 19 December 1961.
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held in Geneva in 1964. There, rhetoric might seem to have been more
pervasive than immediately felt results. However, the needs and expectations of the developing countries were debated and exposed in a semiinstitutional setting; and nascent programs of action and concrete solutions were formally articulated and, in part, adopted. Later that year, the
General Assembly formally established the Conference (UNCTAD) as one
of its organs.7 Since 1964, the Conference has met twice, in New Delhi in
1968 and in Santiago de Chile in 1972. The range of its discussions and the
matters it passes upon have grown apace. A certain ambitiousness and
quasi-politicism is clearly evident in its resolutions. But problems, such as
those mentioned above, have been aired openly and extensively documented, and a wide range of sometimes overlapping solutions have been
mapped out." In the light of UNCTAD and several influential meetings of
the important "Group of 77" developing country members of UNCTAD,
the General Assembly in 1970 designated the decade 1970-80 as the Second
United Nations Development Decade, elaborating at the same time goals
and objectives and several comprehensive policy measures most of which
are identical to programs developed at UNCTAD? By 1973 the General
Assembly had adopted a very depressing first biennial over all review and
appraisal of progress in the implementation of the-development strategy
for the second decade.'" Subsequent General Assembly resolutions" have
shown that the economic problems of the vast majority of the world are
growing at an amazing rate. Therefore, it will be suggested here that the
1975 ACP-EEC Lom6 Convention is an attempt, in part, to actively implement some of the solutions recommended by UNCTAD and the General
Assembly. "2
7. See General Assembly Resolution 1995 (XIX), 30 December 1964.
8. For a discussion of the work of the first two conferences and the now quite sophisticated
administrative and technical machinery of UNCTAD, see B. Gosovic UNCTAD CONFLICT AND
COMPROMISE: THE THIRD WORLD'S QUEST FOR AN EQUITABLE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER THROUGH

(1972).
9. General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
10. General Assembly Resolution 3175 (XXVIII), 17 December 1973.
11. See, e.g., General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI), 1 May 1974; and General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI), I May 1974.
12. These included, among many others, the suggestions that (1) export earnings from
primary commodities should be increased by price stabilization agreements, quota arrangements, buffer stock schemes, floor ceiling prices and price ranges, supplementary financing
to mitigate certain difficulties arising from sudden shortfalls, etc.; (2) the manufactured and
semi-manufactured goods of developing countries should more easily be made to compete in
developed countries by, e.g., a system of generalized preferences; (3) the terms of aid and
debt-servicing should be liberalized and specific minima should be annually invested from
each developed countries' resources; (4) new principles to govern trade and development
should be adopted; (5) discriminatory shipping policies should be abandoned and developed
countries should assist in developing the merchant marines of the developing world. See
generally Gosovic, supra note 8. Other suggestions have included (6) the necessity for inTHE UNITED NATIONS
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The EEC, Trade, And Development Of Developing Countries

Despite what has just been said about the new Lom6 Convention, it
must be pointed out that the EEC's record of activity in the developing
countries stretches further back than the period just discussed. It commences with part IV of the 1957 Treaty of Rome in which the parties, at
France's insistence, agreed to "associate" with the non-European territories which had special relationships with Belgium, France, Italy and the
Netherlands, i.e., mostly overseas possessions. The details and procedure
were, according to the Treaty, worked out by a Convention of Association
dated 1957. The resulting system consisted of: (1) Trade arrangements,
whereby the EEC members granted to the associates the same trade advantages as they accorded to each other by the Treaty of Rome and, additionally, accorded special tariff benefits for the associates' exports of certain key agricultural products. Existing arrangements, whereby certain
members agreed to take minimum quotas of the associates' exports at fixed
prices, were to be gradually increased and spread among the members.
Otherwise, each associate was to accord to all of the members and to each
other the same trading advantages as it accorded to the mother country: 3
thus customs duties were to be gradually abolished. (2) Aid arrangements,
in the form of the European Development Fund (FED) whereby each member pledged a sum of money and all agreed that specified amounts of the
total would be made available for grants for the social and economic development of the associates. (3) Establishment provisions, whereby the EEC
right of establishment of nationals and companies of one member in other
members was to be gradually extended to the associates. In addition, the
free movement of workers from the associates to the EEC was envisaged."
Starting with the Cameroons in 1960, several of the associate countries
in Africa became independent. For formal reasons, therefore, a new treaty
relationship appeared to be appropriate. Furthermore, with the negotiations by the United Kingdom for entry into the EEC it was perceived that
the limited categories of associate states in part NY of the Treaty of Rome
and the 1957 convention needed to be expanded to include independent
Commonwealth countries and dependent British territories after British
admission to the EEC. With the growing political independence of several
of the countries, murmurs about imperialism and the preponderance of
French influence (partly institutionalized in the Treaty and the Convencreased regional cooperation and coordination and (7) the development of principles and rules
to guide and govern trade policy, trade relations and development with a fairly high degree
of coerciveness or obligatoriness.
13. Exceptions included, for example, infant industry protective measures.
14. See, e.g., G. WEI.. A FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? 139-44 (1970); P. OKIGBO, AFRICA
AND THE COMMON MARKET 26-42 (1967); and van den Bergh, The New Convention of Association with African States, 1 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 156-62 (1963-64).

1976]

THE LOME CONVENTION

tion), along with the realization that there were several powerful nonassociate African states, strongly suggested the need for a new and more
comprehensive relationship. Negotiations having commenced in 1961, a
new convention of association was signed on July 20, 1963, at Yaound6 in
the Cameroon.' 5 The new convention, between the EEC and 18 independent African states, went into force on June 1, 1964. Basically, it dealt with
the same range of matters as the earlier arrangement. Its trade provisions
were essentially the same: tariff reductions were to continue, but some
products were to be immediately duty-free; trade liberalization was to be
more rapidly accelerated, e.g., quantitative restrictions being abolished by
the associates within four years, no new ones being authorized to be introduced; most-favored-nation trading treatment was to be accorded member
states by the associates. Furthermore, customs unions or free trade areas
among associated states or between any associated state or states and third
states were authorized; and the EEC was to consult the associates in formulating a common agricultural policy (CAP). In effect, the former special
relations between EEC "mother countries" and former colonies had
ceased. The FED was increased and made available both as grants and as
soft loans. Extra loans by the European Investment Bank were also authorized.
The Convention specified, in addition to the previously authorized infrastructural uses of FED (so-called "economic and social purpose" uses)
the following uses: investment (including technical assistance before and
after investment), general technical cooperation (including personnel
training), diversification of production, and new or existing schemes for
the stabilization of prices and markets on an emergency basis. The Convention also earmarked specific funds for specific types of products and
countries. Also, very modest administrative functions by the associates
were envisaged. The right of establishment was to be accelerated on a
reciprocal basis. To the basic right was added that of freely supplying
services other than wage-earning activities. Furthermore, all parties undertook to liberalize payments, repayments and their free transfer. The new
convention, following the 1961 EEC-Greece Association Agreement, also
established a set of institutions. These were the Association Council," a
quasi-executive organ assisted by the Association Committee; the Parliamentary Conference, 7 a deliberative and advisory organ; and the fivemember Court of Arbitration empowered to settle disputes (with binding
15. 2 INT'I, LEG. MAT'LS 971 (1963). The convention also earmarked specific funds for
specific types of products and countries. Also, very modest administrative functions by the
associates were envisaged.
16. Comprised of associates' governmental representatives and EEC (Council and Commission) representatives and required to take action with common accord between the two
sides, i.e., a bipolar decision-making structure.
17. Composed of equal numbers of members of the European Assembly and the Parliaments of the Associates.
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effects on the parties), relating to the interpretation or application of the
Convention, which the Council was unable to settle or the parties unable
to solve otherwise."'
Despite expectations, the Commonwealth African, Caribbean and other
countries did not become parties to the Yaound6 Convention.' 9 In the five
year period following the signing of Yaound , it became evident that the
opposition of many of the non-associates to such relationships with the
EEC had disappeared and that they were ready, as envisaged in the EEC
Council Declaration of Intention of April, 1963, either to accede to
Yaounde, to negotiate trade agreements, or to enter into association agreements with reciprocal rights and obligations under article 238 of the Treaty
of Rome. 20 In fact, negotiations with Nigeria and with Tanganyika were
already under way. In the case of Nigeria, these negotiations materialized
into an agreement signed July 16, 1966. However, due to the Biafran Civil
War the agreement never went into force. Nevertheless, since the
Agreement contained several novel provisions in comparison with the other
African-EEC agreements, and since it partially influenced the ACP-EEC
Lom6 Convention, it will be briefly summarized. 2 A fairly widespread
feeling among non-associates still remained: that "association" was a relationship of subservience and dependence and probably a form of neocolonialism. Nigeria, in seeking for and obtaining a sui generis type of
agreement, was probably bearing such considerations in mind. More importantly, however, despite her traditional avowal of free trade and her
dislike, nurtured by the debates at UNCTAD and elsewhere, for preferential trading systems, she desired to maintain her traditional and important
trading markets in Europe, to compete with her major competitors (several
of them now beneficiaries under Yaound6), and, as UNCTAD discussions
and resolutions suggested, to insure that if preferences were not to be
abolished, they should be made general for as many countries as possible.
-The Agreement, therefore, could be categorized as something between a
trading agreement and an association agreement. In coverage it, in fact,
closely resembled the Yaound6 scheme with the major exception that it
contained no provisions on aid. Its provisions on trade would liberalize
trade reciprocally in all exports and imports. However, exports of cocoa
18. See WEIL, supra note 14, at 144-56; OKIGBO, supra note 14, at 43-69; van den Bergh,
supra note 14, at 162-76; Note, Consequences of YaoundL for Developing Countries, 8 VA. J.
INT'i, L. 394-401 (1968).
19. The Convention provided for accession (at EEC's discretion after possible consultations in the Association Council) of states with economic structure and production comparable to that of the associates.
20. See Rivkin, Africa and the EEC: New Inter-Regional Association, 2 J. L. & ECON. DEV.
56-58 (1967-68).
21. This is based on WEIL, supra note 14, at 161-70; OKIao, supra note 14, at 90-136, and
Rivkin, supra note 21, at 58-69.
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beans, peanut oil, palm oil and plywood were limited by quantitative
quota restrictions;" beyond these limits the tariffs applicable to third
countries were to apply. Reciprocity was theoretically accorded in respect
of treatment of EEC products by Nigeria's agreement to abolish all customs duties erga omnes over a two year period and at the same time
agreeing to establish preferential treatment for 26 EEC products. 3 Nigeria
was, on the other hand, permitted to maintain Commonwealth preferences." Its provisions on establishment and payments and capital movements were also basically similar to Yaound6's, but they were slightly less
favorable to the EEC mainly due to the absence of aid provisions. Although
the possibility of parliamentary cooperation was envisaged, the only institutional provisions were a council of association and, unlike Yaounde, an
ad hoc arbitration scheme.25
Meanwhile, negotiations had commenced in early 1963 with Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania (as Tanganyika had become, after its union with
Zanzibar on April 26, 1964), the three states comprising the East African
Community. These dragged on over a long period of time because, although the parties were apparently clear that what was needed was a sui
generis type agreement not very different from Nigeria's, points of detail,'
some political differences, and other factors proved to be difficult. Eventually, an agreement was signed at Arusha on July 26, 1968." However, this
agreement never entered into force, due to non-ratification by all the parties. The ten associated states and the EEC now negotiated another convention which was signed at Yaound6 on July 29, 1969.28 This convention
(hereinafter referred to as Yaound6 II), which came into force on January
1, 1971, after necessary ratifications, was quite similar to the first Yaound6
Convention (hereinafter referred to as Yaound6 I).2 In three respects the
two instruments were more or less identical. These were provisions dealing
with: the right of establishment, services, payments and capital; the institutions, and the general final provisions. The provisions on financial and
technical cooperation in the main represented refinements of Yaound6 I'
As for trade provisions, the movement commenced in 1957 almost reached
its logical conclusion: reciprocity and free trade were stressed. Customs
22. This was to preserve the advantages already gained by the 18 associates.
23. These represented 9% of EEC exports to Nigeria and 4% of all of Nigeria's imports.
24. The main reasons for such limited reciprocity were the absence of aid provisions and
the influence of UNCTAD and other developments.
25. As indicative of a desire to synchronize relations with Africa, the agreement was to
expire on the same date as Yaound6 - May 31, 1969.
26. Like reciprocity and particular product protection.
27. See WEre, supra note 14, at 170-72.
28. 9 INT'i. Lc.. MAT'LS 484 (1970).
29. 2 INT'l. LEG. MAT'LS 971 (1963).
30. As would be expected however, FED and other aid was increased, the range of permissible projects was widened, and there were some refinements.
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duties and similar charges were not to be imposed by either side on imports
from the other. The only exceptions to this were (1) on the part of the EEC,
those necessary due to the CAP and due to the existence of a common
organization for the market in CAP-related products, 31 and (2) on the part
of the associated states, those "necessary to meet their development needs
or . . . intended to contribute to their budgets." Quantitative restrictions
were now clearly proscribed, the only exceptions being (1) on the part of
the EEC, those necessary due to the common organization, and (2) on the
part of the associates, those necessary "to meet their development needs
or in the event of difficulties in their balance of payments,"3 and (3) for
any party signatory to a world agreement, the treatment that it accorded
to any product under such an agreement. There were several other differences in the trade provisions of the two conventions. One which may be
mentioned is protocol no. 4,33 whereby the parties, cognizant of the developments taking place in UNCTAD, agreed that the provisions of the Convention, particularly the associates' obligation to accord favorable tariff
treatment to EEC products, did "not conflict with the establishment of a
general system of preferences" and did not prevent the associates from
participating in such a system.
Expansion of this EEC-developing country regime continued. First, on
September 24, 1969, the three East African Common Market countries and
the EEC signed an agreement at last. Similar to the one they had earlier
negotiated, it came into force at the same time as Yaound6 II and had the
same expiration date - January 31, 1975. Then, after negotiations between the EEC and the United Kingdom about British entry resumed in
1970, Mauritius asked to accede to Yaound6 II. This took place on June
30, 1973. Britain's negotiations and its final entry, along with Denmark,
Ireland and Norway, on January 1, 1973,'3 finally propelled the formerly
uncertain African Commonwealth countries, the independent Commonwealth Caribbean countries, three independent Commonwealth Pacific
countries and several other African countries into the new relationship
with the EEC.3 5 Protocol no. 22 to the Act of Accession, 36 as a part of the
accession packet, formally set the stage. It provided that twenty indepen31. See articles 39 and 40, and annex II of the Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S 11, (effective Jan. 1, 1968), reproduced in 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 151 (1973).
32. These restrictions could be imposed simultaneously with the exceptional tariff treatment mentioned above.
33. 2 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 991-92.
34. By virtue of the Treaty of Accession, signed January 22, 1972, reproduced in 11 INT'L
LEG. MAT'LS 397 (1972).
35. In actual fact, this movement commenced around 1969 when, following deposition of
President Nkrumah in Ghana, that country (formerly along with Guinea, one of the original
French colonial associate territories, in the vanguard of anti-association debate), made moves
towards entering into association.
36. Of even date with the Accession Treaty, supra note 36.
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dent Commonwealth countries (including the three East African countries
already related to the EEC) should have the option of participating in a
new association convention along with the 19 associates, one or more special reciprocal association conventions, or trade agreements. It stated that
the EEC would have as its firm purpose the safeguarding of the interests
of all the countries [whose economies depend to a considerable extent on
the export of primary products, particularly sugar. The culmination of this
gradual development in the relationship between the EEC and certain
African and other developing countries was the ACP-EEC Lome Convention of February 28, 1975.
II.

THE ACP-EEC LOM
A.

CONVENTION:

BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE

Results Of The Association Experience

On balance it seems that the Association experience was considered by
most to be beneficial to the EEC, the associates and other countries. From
the point of view of the 22 countries with relations with the EEC, it was
apparent that as far as trade benefits were concerned the relationship was
useful. The volume of trade increased, though not as much as might have
been anticipated.37 However, the value of these benefits had been somewhat lessened because: only one-third of the associated states' exports were
eligible for preferential treatment in the EEC; the CAP affected certain
important products, namely vegetable oils, processed products (based on
fruits and vegetables, cereals, rice, cocoa and manioc), rice, fishery products and certain other products such as beef and veal, cereals and tobacco.
The EEC had introduced on July 1, 1971, the system of generalized preferences, whereby only the most developed of the developing countries were
reportedly likely to benefit. Many of the associates and other states had
insufficient expertise in marketing techniques and lacked the wherewithal
to improve."' Reverse preferences came under attack at UNCTAD and
elsewhere, and were arguably considered to be frustrating the benefits
otherwise derivable from the beneficial trading arrangements, and the nontariff system was in need of refinement.
As far as financial and technical cooperation was concerned, it proved
to be a valuable benefit. According to the EEC Commission, in some cases
it represented one-fifth of public aid received by some countries from all
sources.3 , The amount available had risen from 581 million units of account
37. See memorandum of the EEC Commission to the EEC Council on renewal and enlargement of the association with the AASM and certain Commonwealth developing countries, reproduced in BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIES (Supp. Jan., 1973).

38.

In any case the consultation system needed improvement.

39.

This figure Aent over 30% in some cases. See Commission memorandum, supra note

37.
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under the first FED to 828 million under Yaound6 II, 730 million having
been earmarked under Yaound6 1.40 The financial instruments had been
progressively refined, the range of eligible projects had grown and the aid
was untied, at least nominally." Yet the need for much more financial aid
was clearly articulated by the Africans who saw the need for better rules
for participation in projects by local ventures and for the abolition of
insistence by some EEC members for the approval of pet projects in pet
countries or for the benefit of favored member country enterprises. However, one realistic admission was made: FED tended to perpetuate dependency and contribute to the vulnerability of the Africans in several ways.
Since the conclusion of Yaound6 II, two problems had loomed large,
partly under the stimulation of UNCTAD. First, it was clear that no two
countries had the same developmental needs or parity of disadvantages.
That problem had been partially solved in the administration of FED.
However, it had another dimension. It was now realized that several countries belonged to the group of "least developed" of the developing countries, which in all or most respects should be treated differently. Secondly,
despite the efforts made in the last two FEDs, the fluctuations in commodity prices due to market factors and natural disasters were problems all the
countries shared. The solution which began to emerge and was mentioned
by the EEC Commission was creating a specific fund to fill in gaps created
by serious fluctations in the receipts from specific products. The Commission thought that includible crops might be sugar, ground nuts, ground
nut oil, cocoa, coffee, bananas and copper.42
Notwithstanding these and several other difficulties under the existing
regimes, it seemed that the prospects for future EEC relations with the
several countries were very good. The EEC was their main customer and
supplier. The EEC was the nearest single large market for their traditional
products and was the most likely customer for their industrial goods when
substantial production of these would commence.43 Solidarity between
Third World countries had grown apace during the 1960's and early 1970's
at the United Nations, particularly at UNCTAD and the groups it helped
to spawn." Among the countries which would now seek to begin or continue
these special relationships with the EEC, Nigeria's position as a world
40. See text accompanying notes 94-135 infra.
41. From time to time, criticisms were made in some sectors in the EEC's African partners.
42. For discussions of these various difficulties under the pre-Lome agreements, see Commission memorandum, supra note 37; WEIL, supra note 14, at 156-57; UNCTAD, Third Sess.
Proceedings, Vol. 1 (Report and Annexes), para. 243-55 (1973).
43. This was true as a result of the EEC's ability to handle volume, if any, and its growing
sympathy for the trading problems of this group of nations.
44. For example, the important "Group of 77" developing countries. See generally
Gosovic, supra note 8.
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power was potentially very beneficial in negotiations with the EEC. In any
case, dealing with the EEC as a group during negotiations and the life of
any agreement was evidently beneficial, as the Yaound6 experience
seemed to indicate. And the larger the group the better as long as it was
relatively cohesive. Though the mutual benefits to the EEC from an enlarged group and to the developing country group from an enlarged EEC
were speculative, on balance the relationship seemed a good risk.4 5 Crucial
to any relationship, however, would be a shift from the concept of association to one of cooperation."
B.

Introduction To The Convention

The first concrete proposals for the new convention were made by the
EEC Commission in a memorandum issued early in 1973 to the EEC
Council "on the future relations between the Community, the present
AASM states and the countries in Africa, the Caribbean, the Indian and
Pacific Oceans referred to in Protocol 22.to the act of accession."" This
memorandum summarized the experience under the existing arrangements, particularly Yaound6 II, and made suggestions for a future relationship. Actually, the individual EEC members and council did not agree
with several of the points in this memorandum and this contributed to
several of the difficulties which arose as the negotiations progressed.
The negotiations commenced in earnest in November, 1973.' In all,
some five separate rounds of ambassadorial level meetings of various
lengths were held.' 9 Throughout, the ACP countries actively consulted
about the negotiations, meeting at several levels before and during the
negotiations. At an early one of these meetings, the negotiating states,
members of the OAU, agreed on the principle of a single spokesman. This
principle, which was later adopted by the Caribbean and Pacific countries,
was followed throughout the negotiations, the spokesmanship being rotated.'"
45. For instance, some thought that a continental trade block might counterbalance the
difference in stages of the countries' development and the adverse effects of FED. See, e.g.,
OKIcBo, supra note 14, at 164.
46. See, e.g., OKIGBO, supra note 14, at 168; Commission memorandum, supra note 37.
For discussions of the prospects for a new type of relationship, see WEIL, supra note 14, at
157-60; OKIcBO, supra note 14, at 158-68; Commission memorandum, supra note 37.
47. Commission memorandum, supra note 37.
48. Prior to that, two conferences of EEC and ACP ministers were held at Brussels in July
and August, 1973.
49. The venue was mostly in Brussels. Meetings were also held in Kingston, Jamaica in
July, 1974, when the EEC made two crucial concessions - not to seek reverse preferences
and to set up a compensation fund to guarantee shortfalls in export prices ("Stabex").
Meetings were also held in Lom6.

50.

See

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

COMMUNITIES,

September, 1973, at 5;

BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN

no. 7-8, pts. 1101-06 (1973); id., no. 10, pts. 2310-11 (1973); id., no. 11, pt. 2313
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During the negotiations, as would be expected, there were several hurdles. One of the biggest was the lack of a clear position on several of the
matters being negotiated by the EEC Council and members. The members' domestic difficulties were also very problematic; not the least of these
was Britain's proposed renegotiation of the terms of its entry into the EEC
and the protracted debate in that country leading up to the referendum
in 1974 in which continued membership was affirmed." At times there
were distractions, such as the call of the United Kingdom Minister of
Overseas Development in mid-1974 for more EEC economic aid to Asia,
her reaction to what seemed an excessive preoccupation with Africa." Substantive difficulties related to the different expectations of the ACP countries and the EEC. The ACPs' major negotiating points were articulated
in July, 1973, by the OAU heads of state as follows. There should be:
.148
- non-reciprocity for trade and tariff concessions given by the
EEC;
- extension on a non-discriminatory basis towards third countries
of the provisions on the right of establishment;
- revision of the rules of origin (of ACP products which wished to
qualify for Agreement-treatment) to facilitate the ACP's industrial
development;
- revision of the provisions concerning the movement of payments
and capital to take account of the objective of monetary independence in ACP countries;
- dissociation of EEC financial and technical aid from any particular form of relationship with the EEC;
- free and assured access to EEC markets for all ACP products,
including processed and semi-processed agricultural products,
whether or not subject to CAP;
- a guarantee to the ACPs of stable, equitable, remunerative
prices in EEC markets for their main products;
- no adverse effect on intra-ACP trade by any agreement with the
3
EEC..
(1973); id., no. 12, pt. 2307 (1973); id., no. 4 pts. 1101-05 (1974); id., no. 5, pt. 2322 (1974);
id., no. 6, pts. 2344-45 (1974); id., no. 7-8, pts. 2332-38 (1974); id., no. 9, pt. 2324 (1974); id.,
no. 10, pt. 2330 (1974).
51. See West Africa, July 22, 1974, at 882.
52. This call led to an agreement in principle of EEC development ministers in July, 1974,
that Asia should be treated as of equal importance to Africa; however, they stated that
existing commitments should be honored and nothing much came of her filibuster. See West
Africa, July 22, 1974, at 883.
53. See West Africa, July 23, 1973, at 991-92. Actually, the OAU Secretary-General had
earlier laid down a ten-point negotiating program which in several respects was tougher than
and different from the eight points in the text. See West Africa, July 16, 1973, at 943. Several
of these were later disavowed by the Heads of State and the negotiators. Yet they certainly
colored the entire negotiations; and several emerged in the Convention.
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After the protracted and difficult negotiations, during which the remarkable cohesiveness of the ACP countries was very evident, the convention
was signed at Lome on February 28, 1975. It will come into force the
first day of the second month after deposit of ratification by the EEC
members and at least two-thirds of the ACPs and notification of the conclusion of the Convention by the EEC.54 Pending the coming into force of
the Convention, the Council of Ministers is to adopt any transitional measures that may be required.
The ACP signatories of the Lom6 Convention are as follows:
Madagascar, Mauritius and 17 African States-all Associates
under Yaounde II: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (People's Republic), Dahomey, Gabon,
Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda,
Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta, and Zaire;
Twenty-two Commonwealth States:
- in Africa; Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (all former parties
to the Arusha agreement); Botswana, Gambia, Ghana,
Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Zambia;
- in the Carribean; Barbados, the Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago;
- in the Pacific: Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa;
Six other African States: Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sudan.5
Of those states the 17 which are underlined have been designated among
the "hard-core" least-developed countries by UNCTAD.5 6 In addition, the
Lom6 Convention lists these countries and seven others as necessitous with
regard to certain special measures in connection with the Convention's
provisions on financial and technical cooperation. These seven are: Central
African Republic, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Swaziland, Togo
and Tonga. 57 For non-signatories to become parties, the Convention makes
a distinction between the territories of members of the EEC and states
whose economic structure and production are comparable with those of the
Article 87, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 621.
55. Of interest here is the participation of, Liberia (said to behave usually like a colony
of the U.S., who was never really warm to association and such ideas); Ethiopia (formerly
either hostile or disinterested); Sudan (often considering itself as an Arab state); Guinea (like
Ghana, a long opponent ofthe "neo-colonialism" of the association relationship and quick to
reject the relationship "imposed" in 1957) and, perhaps, Guinea-Bissau, fresh from a bitter
struggle with its former imperialist overlord. See WEL, supra, note 14, at 163-66.
56. See UNCTAD, Third Sess. Proceedings, Vol. 4 (General Review and Special Issues),
para. 229 (1973).
57. Article 48, 14 INT'L. LEG. MAT',S at 615.
54.
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ACP states. In the first case they are entitled to accede upon the approval
of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers. In the second case, both the approval of the Council and the conclusion, in each case, of a separate agreement with the EEC are required.
C.

The Purpose Of The Convention

Much of the rhetoric before and during the negotiations leading up to
the Convention concerned the question of the desirability or otherwise of
"association." The EEC throughout regarded this as a possible form of
relationship; indeed, much of the documentation through 1974 suggests
that, despite the Arusha and Nigeria agreements,5 the Commission and
the Council actually preferred this title. If anything, it would seem that
they preferred to ignore or were not aware of the fact that "association"
now connoted dependence and subservience for many of the "associable"
states. Ultimately, however, the EEC got the message, hence the simple
title to the Convention.
The Convention departs from its predecessors. For example, whereas
Yaound6 I and II reaffirmed the desire of the associated states to maintain
their association with the EEC and expressed their common desire to
cooperate "on the basis of complete equality and friendly relations, observing the principles of the United Nations Charter" and, inter alia, their
determination "to pursue their efforts together with a view to the economic, social and cultural progress of their countries," the Lom6'Convention, while repeating in its preamble goals basically identical to these,
stresses the goals of economic development and cooperation. 9
In addition, cognizant of the worldwide movements in international economic and political fora and in the general realm of trade relations, the
parties express their resolve
to establish a new model for relations between developed and developing
States, compatible with the aspirations of the international community
towards a more just and more balanced economic order; 0
and their desire to safeguard
the interests of the ACP States whose economies depend to a considerable
extent on the exportation of commodities.'
It is arguable that ideas such as these and that of increased dignity
58. See W.u, supra note 14, at 166-72.
59. Also stressed in the preamble is the goal of promoting trade and industrial development between ACP and EEC countries as well as trade cooperation among ACP states. 14
INT'), LEG. MAT'iS at 604.
60. See, e.g., articles 35 and 36, 14 INT'L LEc. MAT'LS at 613.
61. Id.
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influenced the shape of the present institutions. The Court of Arbitration
has been scrapped, its task being placed (at the sole discretion of disputants) in the hands of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, so long as
circumstances permit and the Council is informed, the parties can utilize
"a good offices procedure" - a dispute settlement method not frequently
articulated (almost to the exclusion of other methods) in major treaties."
However, if the Council fails to settle the dispute "at its next meeting,"
either party may appoint an arbitrator; upon which the other must appoint
one "within two months," the third arbitrator being selected by the Council. The Convention does not, however, indicate that is to happen where
neither party first selects an arbitrator. The Parliamentary Conference has
been replaced by a Consultative Assembly, which is given specific power
to adopt resolutions "on matters concerning or covered by" the Convention
and to set up ad hoc consultative committees to undertake such specific
activities as the Assembly may determine. 3 The Convention also establishes a Committee on Industrial Cooperation and ad hoc committees,
working groups and other bodies are also envisaged.64 Otherwise, the institutions have little changed. The Council is largely the same in nature and
function. However, it is no longer assisted by the Association Committee
but by the Committee of Ambassadors which, in the Council's decision,
65
can perform any of the Council's work.
D.

The Convention Outlined

The convention consists of seven titles" and seven protocols" which,
according to article 93,68 form an integral part of the Convention. In addition, there are an annex containing a joint declaration on fishing activities
and 24 single or joint declarations concerning, inter alia, individual or
group interpretations of specific Convention or protocol provisions, or containing views on various policies and rules.6 '
In substance, the Convention is not dissimilar to the Yaound6 regime.
62.

Article 81, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 620-21.

63. Article 80, 14

INT'l LEm. MAT'LS

at 620.

64. Article 74, 14 INT'l. LEm. MAT'LS at 619-20.
65. Article 75, 14 INT'i. LEe.. MAT'LS at 620.
66. The topics dealt with in the titles are, in general, trade cooperation, export earnings
from commodities (including Stabex and the special provisions on sugar), industrial cooperation, financial and technical cooperation, establishment, institutions and general and final
provisions.
67. These protocols concern the definition of the concept of originating products and
methods of administrative cooperation, the application of financial and technical cooperation, ACP sugar, the operating expenditure of the institutions, privileges and immunities,
bananas and rum. See 14 INT'l LEG. MAT'LS at 596.
68. 14 INT'|. LEG. MAT'IS at 622.
69. 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'Ls at 597-600.
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Thus, there are provisions on (1) trade,7 ° (2) financial and technical cooperation, and (3) establishment, services, payments and capital movements.
In addition, however, there are provisions on (4) stabilization of export
earnings, (5) industrial cooperation, (6) a guaranteed price for sugar, (7)
bananas and (8) rum. Of the many novel things about the new Convention,
mention might be made at this point of the principle of consultation which
it enshrines. For example, consultations between the EEC and the ACPs
are required before the EEC takes action in the following cases:
- subjecting one or more ACP agricultural products otherwise
eligible for favorable tariff treatment to the common organization
of the market or to specific CAP-related rules (article 2);
- upon the request of the concerned ACP states, where certain
EEC measures for the facilitation of the movement of goods are
likely to affect the interests of one or more ACP states (article 5);
- where EEC existing rules or regulations of this nature or their
interpretation, application or administration affect the interests of
one or more ACP state (article 6);
- generally to ensure effective implementation of the trade cooperation provisions and specifically
- where the concerned parties, envisaging that their
interests may be affected by trade measures, request;
- at the request of the ACP states, where the EEC
envisages concluding a preferential trade agreement;
- at the request of the concerned parties, where
the EEC or one of its members takes safeguard measures
due certain economic difficulties;
- where the ACPs think that certain agricultural products
call for special treatment (article 11);
- where the ACP state has requested funds from the export stabilization fund and "examination of the total exports of the requesting ACP state show a significant change," so as to determine
whether such change is likely to have an effect on the amount of
the transfer (article 19(4)(b));
- between the competent EEC departments and the representatives of ACP state or states where on the latter's financing proposals being submitted, a project has received the unfavorable opinion
of the responsible EEC body (article 54).11
70. In addition to trade proper and trade liberalization, these also deal with trade promotion, a new departure.
71. In a few of these cases, a provision specifies that the consultation is to take place
within the Council of Ministers. This is required in any case by article 74(8), and the Council
is to make necessary general arrangements, rules and conditions.
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In addition to these specific obligations to consult, the obligations of cooperation and giving information are specifically imposed at several points
and generally pervade the Convention.
III.

THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

A.

Trade Cooperation

Title I of the Convention deals with trade cooperation. Article 1 clearly
sets the pattern that the major purpose of these provisions is to liberalize
ACP trade by making it easier for more ACP products to enter the EEC
and to promote the growth in ACP exports to the EEC. It states that
In the field of trade co-operation, the object of this Convention is to
promote trade between the Contracting Parties, taking account of their
respective levels of development, and, in particular, of the need to secure
additional benefits for the trade of ACP States, in order to accelerate the
rate of growth of their trade and improve the conditions of access of their
products to the market of the European Economic Community . . . so as
to ensure a better balance in the trade of the Contracting Parties.72
Article 2, therefore, grants duty-free entry status to ACP nonagricultural products and to agricultural products not covered by a common organization of the market under the Treaty of Rome or subject, on
importation into the EEC, to specific rules due to the implementation of
the CAP.73 As regards these agricultural products, article 2 nevertheless
ensures that ACPs will receive a favorable trading position in comparison
with third countries. 4 The value of this concession is quite considerable.
The products which hereby obtain duty-free entry constitute 99.2% of all
EEC imports originating in ACPs. Actually, the EEC for a long time during the negotiations had not been prepared to grant duty-free entry to more
than just over 95% of imports from the ACPs. The ACP negotiators, hoping
to develop new crops, stuck out for 100% free entry. It appears that the
final figure was struck on the EEC's offer of a much smaller financial aid
packet than insisted upon by the ACPs. 3
On non-tariff barriers to trade, the Convention unequivocally prohibits
the EEC from applying to imports quantitative restrictions or measures
72.

14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 607.

73. Id.
74. If, at time of importation, the only restrictive measure is customs duties, then there
is duty-free entry. If other measures exist, then they will receive "as a general rule, more
favourable treatment than the general treatment applicable to the same products originating
in third countries to which the most-favored-nation clause applies.
75. See Africa, November 15, 1974, at 8; id., December 20, 1974, at 1; id., January 17,
1975, at 3; West Africa, July 23, 1973, at 992.
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having equivalent effect. 8 However, this provision is not to "prejudice the
treatment that the Community applies to certain products in implementation of world commodity agreements to which the community and the ACP
states concerned are signatory."77
For such beneficial rules to work well and fairly, it has always been
recognized that the concept of "originating products" must be regulated.
This has always been done in EEC practice and under the previous association and other agreements. However, the ACP negotiators were quite adamant that the rules governing origin and proof of origin of their products
were too rigid. However, until well into the negotiations, the EEC held out.
For the ACPs it was nothing less than a matter of the honor of the Third
World. The EEC eventually agreed to liberalize the rules." Annexed to the
Convention is protocol no. 1, setting out at length some detailed rules on
such matters as: definition of "territory;" what type of goods will, in difficult cases, be generally regarded as there originating, e.g., fish and animal
products; the extent to which products created in post-manufacture operations (where manufacture originally took place elsewhere) qualify; the necessary standard documentary evidence of origin (the "movement certificate"), its form, and manner and conditions of issue; good faith and honesty obligations; customs administration, and a consultation and collaboration system."
Complementing the trade provisions so far discussed are provisions elsewhere in the Convention on industrial promotion and financial and technical cooperation. In addition to these, title I contains a chapter on trade
promotion. The parties agree to carry out "trade promotion activities
which will be aimed at helping the ACP states to derive maximum benefit
from" the trade cooperation provisions and the industrial cooperation provisions and "to participate under the most favorable conditions in the
Community, regional and international markets."0 These activities are to
76.

Again, however, certain agricultural products might be affected as in article 2. See
INT'L. LEG. MAT'Ls at 607.
77. Article 3, 14 INT'1. LEG,. MAT'iS at 607. Both sets of trade measures can be derogated
from by the EEC in specific circumstances. First, by article 4, prohibitions or restrictions can
be imposed on grounds of public morality and the like and of fairly wide ranging "protective"
reasons, including "the protection of industrial and commercial property." But these are not
to constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. Second,
in cases of very serious economic difficulty or threatened financial instability, safeguard
measures may be taken (article 10). In the Final Act the EEC declared that it would try to
seek such measures as would "least disturb the exports of ACPs." And such measures do not
apply to the sugar import guarantee. See protocol no. 3, article 1, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at
636.
78. See Africa, January 17, 1975, at 3; West Africa, July 23, 1973, at 992; id., August 5,
1974, at 953.
79. 14 INT'l, LEG. MAT'LS at 622.
80. Title I, ch. 2, 14 INT'i, LEG. MAT'iS at 609.

article 3, 14
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be financed under the financial and technical cooperation provisions of the
Convention.' In addition to such expected activities as market research
and marketing, they extend to basic and advanced vocational training and
"improving the structure and working methods of organizations, departments or firms contributing to the development of the foreign trade of ACP
states, or setting up such organizations, departments or firms."8
At long last, the ideal of non-reciprocity, long sought after in such fora
as UNCTAD and in the more recent negotiations between the EEC 3 and
its African and other partners, has been obtained. The obligation of the
developing country as a condition of obtaining trade benefits of returning
similar benefits has been attacked as being, e.g., "a contradiction in economic terms" in view of the inequality in economic strength, 4 and "a
reversion to the trade patterns of the imperial and colonial era."' 5 Now
article 7 provides there is no requirement for reciprocal treatment of EEC
originating products by the ACPs. 8 However, they are not to "discriminate
among the member states, and shall grant to the Community no less favourable than the most-favoured-nation treatment."8 ' But such treatment
is not to apply in respect of trade or economic relations between ACP states
and other developing countries.
B.

Financialand Technical Cooperation

The Lom6 Convention continues the pattern of the Yaound6 regime with
regard to financial and technical cooperation However, it goes into considerable more refinement and detail than before. The purpose of the provisions in title IV are stated to be
to correct the structural imbalances in the various sectors of the ACP
States' economies. The co-operation shall relate to the execution of projects and programmes which contribute essentially to the ecomomic and
social development of the said States.
2. Such development shall consist in particular in the greater well-being
of the population, improvement of the economic situation of the State,
local authorities and firms, and the introduction of structures and factors
81.
82.

Title IV, 14 INT'l. LEG,. MAT'LS at 614.
Article 13, 14 INT'i. LEG. MAT'IS at 609.

83.

France and Belgium were the most recalcitrant of the EEC members. See AFRICA
July-August, 1974, at 7-9. In fact, even the ACPs were not always in accord. Thus,
at one stage Senegal was saying that to deny reciprocity would deny the agreement's legal
foundations and enable the EEC to break it unilaterally! See West Africa, August 6, 1973,
at 1063.
84. S. Ramphal (Guyana). See EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, September, 1973, at 5.
85. Sir Kamiese Mara (Fiji). Id. See also West Africa, July 23, 1973, at 992.
86. 14 INT'1, LEe. MAT's at 608.
87. Article 7, 14 INT'1. LEG. MAT'I.S at 608.
REPORT,
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whereby such improvement can be continued and extended by their own
means.
3. This co-operation shall complement the efforts of the ACP States and
shall be adapted to the characteristics of each of the said States."
Furthermore, the parties agree that the projects and programs must help
ensure all or part of the following effects:
- growth of the national income of each ACP State;
- improvement of the standard of living and the socio-cultural
levels of populations and of the most under-privileged in particular;
- the establishment of more balanced economic relations between the ACP States and other countries, their greater participation in world trade in general, including, in particular, trade
in manufactured products;
- improvement and control of the conditions of development, in
particular physical factors and technical know-how;
- diversification and integration of the structure of the economy,
on both a sectoral and a geographical basis;
- regional cooperation between ACP States and, where appropriate, between ACP countries and other developing countries."
Whether these objectives are being attained is to be examined by the
Council of Ministers in an annual stocktaking, during which general problems which have arisen are also to be considered.90 Broadly, technical
cooperation is of two kinds - measures linked with investments and measures of general technical cooperation. 9' The former consists of help in
-

advance, concept, and long-term research and planning;

-

preparing projects;

- executing, supervising and maintaining work, investments and
installations;
- providing goods, and meeting the costs of temporary technicians.
The latter is to consist, among other things, of the following:
- information and documentation;
- conduct of various studies a macro and micro nature;
- aid in specific and general training and other educational
schemes and the actual provision of certain courses;
- providing experts, instructors and others for specific missions on
limited bases, at the request of the ACPs.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Article 40, 14 INT'i. LEe.. MAT'i.s at 614.
Protocol no. 2, article 1, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 629.
Article 41, 14 INT'i, LE,. MAT'LS at 614.
Both are also to be the subject of financial cooperation measures where necessary.
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Under the first FED, the EEC provided a total of 581.25 million EEC
units of account (hereinafter referred to as UA).12 This was increased to
UA800 million under Yaound6 1.11 This was slightly increased under
Yaound6 II to UA918 million.'" Now the Community has agreed to provide
UA3,390 million."' This is to be disbursed by FED and by the European
Investment Bank in the following ways: 9"
Type of Financial
Assistance
FED
Grants
Special loans
Risk capital
Stabex fund 7
Eur. Inv. Bank
loans
Total

Amount under Lom6
Convention (in millions)
UA2,100
430
95
375

Comparative Amount under
Yaound6 II (in millions)
UA 748
80 ("loans")

390

90

3,390

918

This total represents over 50% less than the ACPs requested." As the
table shows, financial assistance may take any of several forms." Grants
are, of course, the most desirable form of aid and the Convention seems to
make it quite clear that this and all forms of financial assistance are to be
untied. 00 Special loans, the total amount available for which is to be increased at the end of the five years by any residue of unutilized risk capital,
92. Until 1975, the UA was the approximate equivalent of $1.00 in U.S. currency. The new
UA is based on a formula calculated on the basis of the EEC members' GNPs and foreign
trade capacities. The formula is expressed as an initial index of each member's currency. The
UA is calculated by reckoning the formula against the nine daily market exchange rates. On
March 5, 1975 (the closest date to February 28, 1975, on which figures were available), the
UA's U.S. equivalent was $1.32.
93. Title II, 2 INT'l LEG. MAT'LS at 978.
94. Title II, 9 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 488.
95. See title IV, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'LS at 614, and protocol no. 2, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at
629.
96. Compiled generally from WEIL, supra note 14, ch. 7.
97. See article 16, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'LS at 609.
98. They requested between UA6,000 and 8,000 million. See Africa, December 20, 1974,
at 1; id., January 17, 1975, at 3. The EEC originally proposed "at least" UA2,000 million.
West Africa, August 6, 1973, at 1063; id., September 2, 1974, at 1070.
99. Combinations of financing methods are also authorized, as well as co-financing with,
e.g., credit and development agencies and institutions, firms, EEC members, ACPs, third
countries or international finance organizations. Article 44, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 614-15.
100. In addition, provision is made for "exceptional aid," which is non-reimbursable, to
ACPs faced with serious difficulties resulting from natural disasters or comparable extraordinary circumstances. For this a special appropriation of UA50 million of FED is made initially.
Over the five years not more than UA150 million must be appropriated. Article 59, 14 INT'L
LEG. MAT'I.S at 617-18. See also, annex III of the Final Act on the concept of serious difficulties. 14 INT'i. LEG. MAT'lS at 598.
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are available on very soft terms - forty years duration with a grace period
of ten years at one percent interest per year. ' 01These terms are fully in
accordance with the recommendations of UNCTAD and other bodies. Risk
capital is intended
to assist the execution of industrial, mining and tourism projects of general interest to the economy of the ACP State or ACP States concerned
102

This is "in order to step up the own [sic] resources or resources assimilated thereto, of those countries; firms."" 3 It is available in two forms: (1)
the acquisition by the EEC of temporary minority holdings "where appropriated" and which "as soon as appropriate" must be transferred to nationals or institutions of the ACP states, and (2) quasi-capital aid, available on a case-by-case basis, at interest rates not greater than those
charged by the Bank, in the form of subordinated loans' 4 or conditional
loans."'' In addition to the general uses for risk capital, quasi-capital aid
can also be made available to "development financing institutions where
the characteristics of their activities and management so permit"''0 and
"to ACP States in order to enable them to acquire a holding in the capital
of industrial, mining and tourism firms where such an operation comes
under the financing of new productive investments and is supplemented
by another financial intervention"''0 7 by the EEC. The terms of the Bank's
loans are: duration depending on the economic and financial characteristics of the project but not to exceed 25 years at, apparently, the Bank's
normal interest rate which, however, is to be reduced by a three percent
interest rate subsidy to be adjusted in special cases so that the actual rate
payable is between five percent and eight percent.0 "
The Convention departs from its predecessors in its provisions on the
range of potential beneficiaries.'09 These are: (1) Regional or interstate
bodies to which the ACP states belong and which are authorized by such
states."'" The types of projects envisaged are: transport and communcia101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
project
106.
107.
108.

Protocol no. 2, article 3, 14 INT'L LEG. MAr'Is at 629.
Protocol no. 2, article 4, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'LS at 629.
Id.
Payable only after European Investment Bank (EIB) loans have been settled. Id.
Id. Redemption is due only after the satisfaction of the special conditions of the
financed.
Protocol no. 2, article 4, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 630.
Id.
See article 42, 14 INT'1. LEG. MAT'LS at 614, and-protocol no. 2, article 5, 14 INT'L LEG.
MAT'LS at 630.
109. See article 45, 14 INT'l, LEG. MAT'iS at 615, article 47, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 615;
article 49, 14 INT'i. LEG. MAT'IS at 615-16; and protocol no. 2, ch. 4-7, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS
at 629-31.
110. Article 49, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'IS at 615-16.
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tions; joint exploitation of natural resources and energy production; research and technology; education and training programs; and specific
areas such as agriculture, industry, stockbreeding and tourism. Ten percent of all aid funds is available for these projects. (2) Joint bodies set up
by the EEC and the ACPs and authorized by the ACPs "to attain certain
specific objectives, notably in the field of industrial and trade cooperation.""' (3) The ACP states, ACP local authorities and public and
public development agencies. (4) Private bodies working in ACP states for
economic and social development of the population."' (5) Firms "carrying
out their activities, in accordance with industrial and business management methods [sic].""' (6) Groups of producers and where there are none,
individual producers." '4 (7) Scholarship holders and trainees "for training
purposes."" 5
As this list of beneficiaries shows, the.range of projects intended to be
benefited is also very wide."' It comprehensively covers trading and marketing, general agricultural and industrial and infrastructural development very widely conceived, assistance to schemes designed to help small
and medium sized national firms and "microprojects for grassroots development, in particular in rural areas."" 7 Up to UA20 million of grant funds
may be utilized for such microprojects no single one of which can receive
more than UA75,000.1" The projects must meet real local priorities and
ensure the community's active participation. The projects can include
dams, wells and water supply systems, silos and warehouses for storing
provisions and crops, rural service tracks and bridges, animal vaccination
pens and corridors, primary schools, dispensaries, maternity homes, social
assistance centres, market buildings and facilities to encourage commercial and industrial activity . .. ."I
The Convention specifies that the responsibility for executing the projects and for negotiating relevant contracts belongs to the appropriate
states, or their authorized beneficiaries, which must manage and maintain
the work. Although the states are now fully responsible for conceiving their
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See article 43, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 614, and article 46, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at
614.
117. Article 46, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 615. Up to UA2 million per scheme in lines of
credit are available. No single project can get more than UA200,000. Protocol no. 2, article
13, 14 INT'i, LEG. MAT'[-' at 632.
118. Protocol no. 2, article 15, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 632. In principle, there must also
be contributions by the ACP state and by the local community (in money or kind).
119. Id.
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own projects and preparing proposals in the form of "dossiers," they do not
have real responsibilities by way of disbursing the funds and actually
administering them at the source level. 2 Nevertheless, protocol no. 2 painstakingly seeks to further "untie" the aid by elaborating rules for competition and terms of preference for national firms and "[dirawing up, negotiation and conclusion of technical cooperation contracts."' 2'
C.

Establishment, Services, Payments And Capital Movements

These provisions do not differ radically from comparable provisions of
Yaound6. As would be expected, there are several escape provisions. Thus
the establishment and services obligations can be departed from by either
side if, for a given activity, a party is unable to provide the required nondiscriminatory treatment. 2 2 Foreign exchange protective measures can be
imposed if justified by reasons relating to serious economic difficulties or
severe balance of payments problems.'2 3 Likewise, discriminatory measures or treatment may be taken if they are unavoidable and if they are
maintained or introduced in accordance with international monetary rules
and if every effort is made to minimize any adverse effects on the parties
concerned.'2
D.

Stabilization Of Export Earnings ("Stabex")

United Nations bodies and others have for several years now been
discussing the problems posed by shortfalls in earnings of developing countries from exports of primary commodities. The reasons for such shortfalls
include market factors, including changing demand patterns and the production of synthetics in the developed countries, natural catastrophies and
political manipulation. Solutions suggested by UNCTAD and other bodies
have included the adoption of a standstill principle, i.e., effectively to
freeze development and expansion of competitive industries in synthetic
products; this has been, of necessity, rather vague. Market intervention
tends to be very problematic. Supplementary financing of normal and
expanded production processes, including funds for the creation of buffer
stocks, have also been mooted as suggestions. So have suggestions for the
120. This seems to have been one of the ACP states' demands. At least some spokesmen
have so indicated. See West Africa, July 6, 1973, at 943. See also, id., March 4, 1974, at 279,
and id., July 23, 1973, at 992.
121. Title to ch. 9, protocol no. 2, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 634.
122. Article 62, 14 INT'l. LE. MAT'LS at 618.
123. Article 65, id.
124. Article 66, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'LS at 619. However, the ACPs must in any case pay
interest, commission and amortization on loans and quasi-capital aid and make available to
the Bank the foreign exchange necessary for the transfer of all sums received by it in national
currency which represent the net revenue and proceeds from transactions involving the EEC's
acquisition of capital holdings.
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stabilization, in a general way, of export earnings. These suggestions too
have, almost by necessity in the atmosphere of United Nations plenary
bodies, tended to be unspecific and generalized. And implementation of
even more specific schemes might appear to be hard to come by. The Lom6
Convention, remarkably, tries to fill the gap with its Stabex system established in title II.
The aims of the Stabex system are:
remedying the harmful effects of the instability of export earnings and of
thereby enabling the ACP States to achieve the stability, profitability and
sustained growth of their economies .... 125
The focal point of the system is the UA375 million allocated to the
stabilization fund,' 21 which is entirely administered by the EEC through
the Commission. The money is divided into five equal installments, the
balance of which from any previous years is carried forward. From the
fund, transfers in the nature of loans are made to ACPs, where products
on which they are dependent have been affected by price and/or quantity
fluctuations. ACP states which have received such transfers
shall contribute, in the five years following the allocation of each transfer
towards the reconstitution of the resources made available for the system
by the Community.'These repayments are interest free. If at the end of the five year period,
however, the resources have not been fully reconstituted, the Council of
Ministers may decide that the sums outstanding are to be reconstituted
wholly or partially in one or more installments'25 or that the rights to
repayment should be waived.
There are 14 major products which qualify for this treatment: groundnut
products; cocoa products; coffee products; cotton products; coconut products; palm, palm nut and kernel products; raw hides, skins and leather;
wood products; fresh bananas; tea; raw sisal and iron ore.'12 With the
subproducts the Convention specifies, the total number of eligible products is twenty-nine.' 3' For an ACP to seek to obtain the benefits of the fund,
125. Article 16, 14 INT'L. LEG. MAT'is at 609.
126. See articles 18 and 42, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'is at 610, 614.
127. Article 21, 14 INT'L LFG,. MAT'l.s at 611.
128. Id. Presumably on the part of any one recipient, to the extent of its transfer. The
least developed, landlocked and island states are not required to repay.
129. Article 17, 14 INT'l. IEc.. MAT'LS at 609.
130. The list grew during the negotiations. Originally the EEC Commission had proposed
only the first four main products plus fresh bananas. See Commission memorandum, supra
note 37. According to article 17(3), 14 INT'1. LEG. MAT'LS at 610, the list can be increased, not
less than 12 months after the Convention comes into force, by decision of the Council of
Ministers. Sugar was included in the Commission's proposals, but there are now specified
arrangements for this product in article 25, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 611, and in protocol no.
3, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'[S at 636.
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its dependency on the product must be established by the application of a
formula which specifies the minimum amount of dependency (the "dependence threshold"): during the year preceeding the year of application, earnings from the product or products of all destinations must have
represented at least 7.5% of the total earnings from merchandize exports. 3'
One other hurdle must be crossed before a state qualifies: for each ACP
state a reference level must be calculated of the moving average of earnings
from exports of each product to the EEC over the four years preceeding
the year of application. If earnings are decreased in that year by at least
7.5% the state qualifies.' 3 The difference between the reference
level and
3
actual earnings "shall constitute the basis of the transfer.'
E.

Industrial Cooperation

Title III of the Lome Convention deals with this topic explicitly for the
first time in the history of these EEC agreements. The title specifies a
range of activities in which the EEC will cooperate with the ACPs. In so
doing, the EEC is entitled to utilize the various funds available for financial and technical cooperation under title IV.3 4 The activities specified are
in:
(1) The fields of industrial infrastructures and ventures, industrial training, technology, research, information and promotion
5
and trade cooperation."
(2) The setting up and extension of the infrastructure necessary for industrial development."3
(3) Setting up industries to process raw materials and to manufacture finished and semi-finished products.'37
(4) Training and financing the training of industry-related per38
sonnel and financing training facilities.
(5) The establishment, development and encouragement of
small and medium-sized firms by financing them, creating necessary infrastructures and industrial estates, training and establish131. For sisal the percentage is 5%. For the least developed, landlocked and island ACPs
it is 2.5'. Article 17(2).
132. Article 19, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 610. The figure is 2.5% for the least developed,
landlocked and island ACPs.
133. If the fall in earnings from exports is the result of a trade policy measure of the ACP
state adversely affecting exports to the EEC in particular, the request will not be admissible.
Article 19, 14 INT'i. LEG. MAT'iS at 610-11.
134. Article 37, 14 INT'l LEG. MAT'IS at 613.
135. Article 27, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'ls at 612.

136.
137.
138.

Article 28, 14
Article 29, 14
Article 30, 14

INT'l. LEG. MAT'LS
INT'l. LEG. MAT'iS
INT'L LEG. MAT'LS

at 612.
at 612.
at 612.
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ing specialized advisory services and credit facilities. 3 '
(6) Carrying out industrial information and promotion
schemes and securing and
intensifying information exchanges and
40
contacts with the EEC.'
(7) Carrying out trade promotion schemes.'
The Convention also states that the EEC "is prepared in particular" to
help the ACPs in several specific ways to overcome obstacles which they
encounter in getting access to and adapting technology."' So as not to
make this title a set of empty obligations, the Convention establishes a
Committee on Industrial Cooperation, which is to be supervised by the
Committee of Ambassadors. The Committee's functions are, inter alia, to
implement title III and to examine problems in this area and suggest
appropriate solutions."' Another function of the Committee is to guide,
supervise and control the activities of the Center of Industrial Development which is to be established."'
F.

Sugar And Certain Other Commodities

One further major innovation of the Lome Convention is the group of
provisions on sugar, intended, like Stabex, to battle the problem of shortfalls from exports and to substitute for the preferences formerly enjoyed
by Commonwealth sugar producers under the British prefernce system. It
does so by guaranteeing purchases of specific quantities of cane sugar, raw
or white, at specific minimum prices." ' The EEC has agreed to purchase
a total amount of 1,400,000 tons of sugar each year from the 13 ACP sugarproducing states."06 Each of the states agrees to sell a specified amount
to the EEC each year. If any state fails to deliver its annual quota" 7 in
full for reasons other than force majeure, then its quota will be reduced
by the undelivered quantity in each subsequent year." 41 If, however, non139.
140.
141.

Article 32,
Article 33,
Article 34,
MAT'i.s at 609, and

14 INT'L LEG. MAT'Is at 612.
14 INT'). LEG. MAT'Is at 613.
14 INT'L. LEG. MAT'i.S at 613. See also title I, chapter 2, 14 INT'L LeG.
text accompanying notes 80 through 82, supra.

142.
143.

Article 31, 14 INT'l. LEG. MAT'I-S at 612.
Article 35, 14 INT'L IEG. MAT'I.S at 613.

144.

This center is to perform study, informational, intelligence - gathering and middle-

man functions. Article 36, 14 INT'L. LEG. MAT'IS at 613.
145. Article 25, 14 INT'l. LEG. MATI.S at 611. The ACPs can, however, sell at higher market

prices, where these exist.
146. The figure includes the sugar-producing dependent territories. From the 13 alone the
amount is 1,221,500 tons.
147. The year runs from July 1 to June 30.
148.

Protocol no. 3, article 7(3), 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 637. The Commission might

decide to reallocate the undelivered quantity among the other states in subsequent periods.
Id., article 7(4).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

delivery is on account of force majeure, the EEC Commission, at the
state's request, shall allow the necessary additional period for delivery.
The price is to be negotiated annually; it must, however, be expressed in
units of account and is to be based on unpacked sugar, CIF European
poarts of the EEC. 49 For the period of February 1, 1975, to June 30, 1976,
the price agreed on is UA25.53 per 100 kilograms for raw sugar 50 and
5
UA31.72 per 100 kilograms for white sugar.1 1
In light of the serious problems facing producers of primary products
these provisions are to be regarded as very beneficial indeed. In three
respects this is reinforced. First, the sugar protocol is to remain in force
for an indefinite period after the expiration of the Convention.1 2 In the
second place, it is provided that the safeguard clause of article 10 of the
Convention' 3 shall not apply to the sugar agreement.5 4 Finally, although
the sugar protocol is carried out within the framework of the management
of the common organization of the sugar market, this is in no way to
prejudice the commitment of the EEC. 5
On certain other products vital to some of the ACPs, the negotiators were
unable to agree to proposals as far-reaching as the sugar agreement. However, some measure of accommodation was attempted. Thus, on bananas,
in addition to the application to that product of Stabex, the protocol no. 6
the parties agree to take steps to implement the following objectives: (1)
not placing any ACP state in a position less favorable than in the past or
present regarding access to EEC markets and market advantages, and (2)
joint endeavors to increase exports.'56 There is also a protocol on rum.' 5,
G.

Special Provisions Beneficial To Less-Advanced States

As mentioned earlier, UNCTAD and other bodies have been concerned
about the special problems of certain types of developing countries whose
lot is worse than that of the majority of developing countries. Again, the
149. Id., article 5(4), 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'i.s at 637.
150. This works out to about UA279.59 per metric ton.
151. This works out UA225.30 or £ 151.15 per metric ton. In fact, the parties have agreed
to sell at £ 260 per long ton in 1975.
152. It can be denounced by any of the ACP beneficiaries or by the EEC "with respect to
each [sicl ACP State" after two years' notice. Protocol no. 3, article 10, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS
at 637. In annex XXII of the final act, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 600, the EEC declares that

the possibilities of denunciation are "for the purposes of juridical security and do not represent for the Community any qualification or limitation of the principles" set out in the
protocol.
153. See note 79, supra.
154. Protocol no. 3, article 1(2), 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 636.
155. Id.
156. E.g., by increasing production and consumption. Somalia's needs are specially
noted.
157.

Protocol no. 7, 14 INT'l. LEG,. MAT'i.S at 640.
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Convention goes far in advancing the discussion from the general to the
specific. Thus, in connection with Stabex, the two thresholds are much
lower for 34 least developed, landlocked or island states.1 18 Furthermore,
they are not required to repay transfers they receive from the fund. Again,
when the Council of Ministers makes its annual stocktaking of the financial and technical cooperation measures, it is to consider specifically the
measures taken in favor of the least developed ACP states. In the implementation of these measures, furthermore, special attention is to be paid
to the needs of the least developed ACPs'55 "so as to reduce the specific
obstacles which impede their development an prevent them from taking
full advantage of the opportunities offered by financial and technical cooperation." ' Finally, protocol no. 2, on the application of financial and
technical cooperation, provides in chapter 5 for special measures in favor
of the least developed states.'1'
IV.

IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE UNITED STATES

A.

Introduction

The ACP-EEC Lome Convention marks the culmination of a movement
which commenced in 1957. The basic concern of the EEC has been to help
its members with overseas territories to phase out their obligations as the
Community takes steps toward further improving its economic well-being
by regional integration and coordination. Those members have been concerned, too, with maintaining close ties with areas with an historical, albeit
dependent, relationship and cultural, though derivative, affinity. In a divisive world this might well pay high dividends.' 2 From "association," however, and the dependency which this tends to connote, the relationship has
matured into one of more dignified cooperation. In other respects too, e.g.,
in the area of trade liberalization, the movement commenced in 1957 has
been completed.
Other developments in the Convention such as the Stabex system, the
special treatment of sugar and the stimulation of industrial development
represent novel departures in the area of international economic relations
and the implementation of several of the recommendations made by such
agencies as UNCTAD.'6 3 The growing cohesiveness of developing countries
158. These are listed in article 24, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 611. See notes 131 and 132,
supra.
159. Twenty-four of these are listed in article 48, 14 INT'L LEa. MAT'LS at 615. The Council
of Ministers can amend the list.
160. Id.
161. This means, in effect, those listed in article 48, id.
162. See WElL, supra note 14.
163. Former criticisms of the ungeneralized and selective nature of the former agreements,
as being incompatible with UNCTAD's goals might now disappear or be muted in view of
the vastly increased number of developing country beneficiaries under Lom6.
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has, furthermore, now been practically implemented for these 46 states
which have agreed to institutionalize their quests for increased benefits
and synchronize some of their dealings with the developed world. It is too
early to ascertain whether the multi-dimensionalism sometimes apparent
within the Organization of African Unity"4 is likely to continue. At any
rate, it appears that with the present economic exigencies and the increasing distance from the colonial era, the Francophile-Commonwealth cleavage has largely dissipated, at least in this context. There is evidence of this
in the fact that the 15 states which signed the Lagos Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States on May 28, 1975, are a mixture
65
of French-speaking, English-speaking and Portugese-speaking nations.
In fact, the Lom6 Convention attempts to stimulate regional solutions to
problems in several of its provisions. Thus, article 7(2)(b) states that the
requirement of the ACPs to accord most-favored-nation treatment to the
EEC is not to apply "in respect of trade or economic relations between
ACP states or between one or more ACP states and other developing countries." 16 Furthermore, in title IV regional bodies are listed as eligible for
financial and technical cooperation, and the Community is obliged, in the
implementation of the title, to "provide effective assistance for attaining
the objectives which the ACP states set themselves in the context of regional and interregional cooperation."'' 7 Annexed to the Convention too is
a joint declaration that arrangements are to be made for the East African
Community and the Caribbean Community' to be represented in the
Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors and that requests
for arrangements in respect of other regional groupings between ACP states
are to be examined on a case by case basis. 9 The interesting speculation
is whether, at least for some purposes,the 46 may begin to regard themselves or be regarded as an international region; it is well-known that
geographical proximity is less and less regarded as a crucial criterion in
identifying such a region. '7°
164. See OKI.BO, supra note 14, at 163.
165. They are Dahomey, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta. 14 INT'L
LEG. MAT'LS at 1200.

166.
167.

14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 608.
Article 47, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'Ls at 615.

168.

The treaty establishing this Community was signed on July 4, 1973. See 12 INT'L LEG.
1154 (1973). The East African Community has been in existence since 1917.
169. The other groupings are the effete West African Customs Union, the Union of African
and Malagasy States (created in 1960 and most of whose members signed the new West
African Community Treaty), the Equatorial Customs Union, and the Customs Union between Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. See OKIGBO, supra note 14 at 146-53.
MAT'LS

170.

See B. RUSSE'Tr,

INTERNATIONAL

REGIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1967).
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B.

CONVENTION

Impact On The United States

It is clear that in several respects the Convention and all it brings with
it will have a considerable impact on the United States. We will now
outline the main areas in which this impact is likely to be felt.
1. InternationalRelations Generally
The 46, as we have just seen, are a group with common problems and
attainable goals which can be solved and attained if they act in coordination and with solidarity. This, plus the spirit of dignified cooperation we
earlier identified and the possibly emerging notion of regionalism will not
improbably conduce to toughened unified stances of these nations in international fora such as the United Nations. Much of this has now been
evident for a number of years, though in the wider context of the Group of
77 developing country-members of UNCTAD.'7 Much of the confrontation
has been between the United States and the larger group. Now the smaller
group of 46 might become more vocal and assertive, with their increased
feeling of incipient economic activism. Whether this will transcend the
level of political debate remains to be seen.
Closer home, the Convention cannot but conduce to the stimulation of
Caribbean independence movements. One of the signatories of the Convention, Grenada, only just attained independence. Prior to that it was one
of the six Commonwealth Caribbean states "in association""' with the
United Kingdom. It is well known that at least one of the remaining associate states, Antigua, is seriously considering independence. This feeling
will doubtless spread to the four others and to the dozen or so other Commonwealth and other colonies and territories in or around the Caribbean.
With their small populations, nearly all under 100,000 persons, and their
potential susceptibility to political and ideological trends normally considered anthitecal to the powers that be in this country, increased expenditures by the United States in attempted surveillance, guidance and friendship cultivation is very likely, before and after independence.'
171. Illustrations are: (1) their solidarity in the debate which led to the adoption in
December 1974 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, General Assembly
Resolution 3281 (XXIX) 9 December 1974; (2) the strongly worded draft outline for the
preparation of an international code of conduct on transfer of technology by Brazil's expert
on behalf of the Group of 77's experts. See 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS at 1335. The Eastern
European Socialist (Group D) experts disagreed with several important aspects of this draft.
Id. at 1344.
172. A slightly less dependent form of colonialism. See Brokerick, Associated Statehood-A New Form of Decolonization, 17 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 368 (1968).
173. U. S. foreign policy might at some stage consider it worth the while seeking to
coordinate positions with this potentially large English-speaking bloc in the OAS, to which
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago already belong.
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2.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

United States Exports and Imports

The overall picture of trading between the United States and 10 different
areas of the world from 1972-75 was as follows:
U.S. Exports and Imports 1972-197511
(In millions of dollars)
Exports1 75

Imports

Net Balance

49,759
12,415
6,467
808
15,361
1,954
4,963
4,373
1,034
1,500
883

55,583
14,927
5,772
1,231
15,423
773
9,064
5,264
1,145
1,578
334

-5,824
-2,512
+ 695
- 423
62
+ 1,181
-4,101
- 891
- 111
78
+ 529

71,339
15,104
8,921
1,008
21,359
3,040
8,313
6,600
1,744
2,081
2,491

69,476
17,715
7,827
1,780
19,286
1,396
9,676
7,043
1,562
2,557
593

+ 1,863
-2,611
+ 1,094
- 772
+2,073
+ 1,644
-1,363
- 443
+ 182
- 476
+ 1,898

98,506
19,932
14,504
1,309
28,639
5,557
10,679
9,196
2,697
3,204
2,239

100,972
22,282
13,678
4,742
23,745
4,735
12,455
10,264
1,503
6,547
1,007

-2,466
-2,350
+ 826
-3,433
+4,894
+ 822
-1,776
-1,068
+1,194
-3,343
+ 1,232

1972
Total
Canada
19 American Republics
Other West, Hemisphere
Western Eruope
Near East
Japan
East and South Asia
Oceania
Africa
Socialist areas
1973
Total
Canada
19 American Republics
Other Western Hemisphere
Western Europe
Near East
Japan
Eastern and Southern Asia
Oceania
Africa
Socialist areas
1974
Total
Canada
19 American Republics
Othen Western Hemisphere
Western Europe
Near East
Japan
Eastern and Southern Asia
Oceania
Africa
Socialist areas

174. Source: U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS (April, 1975).
175. Includes military grants-in-aid, shipments under Agency for International Development (AID) and private relief shipments.
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These figures show that the United States suffered an adverse balance
in 1972 and 1974.176 In all three years there was an adverse balance in
trading with "other western hemisphere" (see chart above), which includes
the Caribbean ACPs, and Africa. In trading with Western Europe there
was an adverse balance only in 1972.
A more accurate picture of the trading picture between the United
States and the EEC, Africa and the Caribbean ACPs 177 will be obtained
from the following table.
U.S. Exports And Imports With The EEC, The
7
African ACP's"' And The Caribbean ACP's1 '
1972 - 197 51"
(In millions of dollars)
Exports

Imports

11,900
518
545

12,489
859
731

16,745
769
687

15,605
1,440
935

+1,140
- 671
- 245$s

22,069
1,142
892

19,205
4,301
2,583

+2,864
-3,159
-1,691

Net Balance

1972
EEC
African ACP's
Caribbean ACP's

-

589
341
186

1973
EEC
African ACP's
Caribbean ACP's
1974
EEC
African ACP's
Caribbean

The following table with the share of the United States in total exports
and imports of 11 African ACPs and four Caribbean ACPs and the value
of their exports and imports in the latest years for which figures were
available will help explain the reason for the adverse balances shown in
the preceeding table. The table will in addition indicate the product areas
covered by Stabex in which these countries export most heavily to the
United States."'
176.
177.
cannot
178.
179.
180.
181.
sion in

There was also an adverse balance (of $1,433M) in 1971.
Separate figures for Fiji and Tonga are not available, hence the Pacific ACP picture
be given.
Figures for trading with Guinea-Bissau and Upper Volta were not available.
Only an approximation of the figures for Grenada is given.
U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 174.
Products within the Stabex scheme have been selected for the purposes of the discussection C below.
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U.S. Percentage Share Of Total Exports And Imports
Of 11 African ACP's And 4 Caribbean ACP's
(Including value in millions of dollars of
such exports and imports in the latest year
between 1970 and 1975 in which figuresavailable)I 2
Exports to the U.S.
Imports from the U.S.

Cameroon
Exports $218/1972
Imports $299/1972
Ethiopia
Exports $124/1971
Imports $188/1971
Ghana
Exports $488/1972
Imports $373/1972
Ivory Coast
Exports $601/1972
Imports $466/1972
Kenya
Exports $267.4/1972
Imports $497.3/1972
Liberia
Exports $382/1972
Imports $178/1972
Nigeria
Exports $3400/1973
Imports $1900/1973
Tanzania
Exports $318.7/1972
Imports $410/1972
Uganda
Exports $260.6/1972
Imports $113.8/1972
Zaire
Exports $692/1972
Imports $638/1972
Zambia
Exports $773.8/1972
Imports $565.3/1972
Bahamas
Exports $246/1970
Imports $515.6/1970
Jamaica
Exports $343/1971
Imports $550.4/1971
Trinidad
Exports $520.1/1970
Imports $657.1/1970

Main Exports

1972

1973

1974

1972

1973

9

7

NA

11

9

NA cocoa, coffee

35

30

NA

9

9

NA coffee, oilseeds, hides

13

13

NA

18

15

NA cocoa, .wood

14

11

NA

6

8

NA cocoa, coffee, wood

4

6

NA

6

8

NA coffee, tea

21

NA

NA

30

28

21

24

NA

10

10

6

8

8

5

3

6

coffee

20

20

24

3

2

5

coffee, tea

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Under
0.5

1

NA

9

9

NA

88

NA

NA

28

NA

NA

44

41

NA

37

39

NA bananas

47

56

NA

19

16

NA

1974

6

coffee, iron ore

NA cocoa, hides, wood

NA coffee, ground-nut oil

182. Based on U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Overseas Business Reports (April, 1975; Febru-ary, 1973; April, 1973). These countries are the main ACP trading partners of the USA.
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It should be carefully noted that in several other important product
areas these countries trade extensively with the United States but that the
Stabex products have been chosen as those in respect of which retaliatory
action by the United States, plausibly authorized under current legislation
discussed below," 3 is not impossible. What is immediately noticeable in
fact is that in the case of nearly every country the volume of trade is quite
low. Furher information 11 reveals that in those cases where the United
States' share of exports was greater than its share of imports, there were
usually explanations which suggested that the picture was not really harmful to United States trade. Thus, Nigeria's and Trinidad and Tobago's
figures are largely due to crucial petroleum exports. And Jamaica and the
Bahamas both export light manufactured goods from industries with
United States investments. In addition, the Bahamas exports refined petroleum and petroleum products and Jamaica exports bauxite and aluminum. In both cases the enterprises are American owned. The overall adverse ACP-United States trading picture, therefore, should give no cause
for alarm. It is also believed that this conclusion is not affected by the
following table of total United States exports and imports for 1972-74 in
selected "Stabex products" and sugar, aluminum and bauxite, copper and
petroleum.
U.S. Overall Exports And Imports In "Stabex Products"
And Certain Other Products 1972 - 197585
(In millions of dollars)
Exports

Imports

Net Balance

151
1,182
66
65
186
63
416
832
181
67
2,607

- 151
- 1,182
66
+ 228
- 186
63
- 389
- 832
- 181
+ 12
-2,163

212
1,570
84
85
193

- 212
-1,570
84
+ 292
- 193

1972
Cocoa products
Coffee products
Coconut products
Hides, etc.
Bananas
Tea
Iron ore
Sugar
Aluminum and bauxite
Copper
Petroleum

-

293
27
79
444

1973
Cocoa products
Coffee products
Coconut products
Hides, etc.
Bananas
183.
184.

Section C, infra.
See supra note 182.

-

377
-

816
Tea
Iron Ore
Sugar
Aluminum and bauxite
Copper
Petroleum
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70
534
925
176
89
4,593

70
- 496
- 925
- 176
+ 85
-4,075

316
1,504
238
78
201
79
696
2,256
220
151
16,482

- 316
-1,504
- 238
+ 261
- 201
79
- 661
-2,256
- 220
+ 40
-15,690

1974
Cocoa products
Coffee products
Coconut products
Hides, etc.
Bananas
Tea
Iron ore
Sugar
Aluminum and bauxite
Copper
Petroleum

-

339
35
191
792

Immediately before the Convention, therefore, the United States enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with the EEC. On the other hand, it
seemed to enjoy an adverse balance with the majority of the ACPs. However, there were sound explanations for this giving no cause for alarm. And
there was no case where it could be said that, at least in the primary
commodities covered by the Stabex scheme, any of the ACPs came anywhere near to dominating the United States market.
The question now is whether the trading picture is likely to be adversely
affected by the Convention. At the moment it is difficult to make any
predictions. If it be assumed, however, that EEC imports of ACP aluminum and bauxite,' 6 copper, iron ore and petroleum' 7 will increase significantly as a result of the Convention, then there are chances that the EEC's
competitive trading position will improve.' 8
As far as-the ACPs are concerned, it may be that one of the effects of
the Convention will be to induce them to divert to the EEC certain products which otherwise would be exported to the United States. The most
important of these would be Nigerian oil, Jamaican aluminum and bauxU. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 174.
186. Guyana has nationalized American bauxite investments and is actively seeking new
customers. Jamaica has imposed a very heavy levy on the production of bauxite (which is
under American control), and ultimately divestment is not unlikely.
187. Of all of these minerals only iron ore (UA275,890,000) was reportedly imported into
the EEC from the ACPs in 1973. See EEC Commission, Lom6'Dossier 28(1975); The Courier,
No. 31 (Special Issue) March, 1975.
188. The cost of the EEC's increased financial cooperation committment, including
Stabex, and of the removal of its tariffs and other trade restrictions would have to be considered, however.
185.
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ite' and possibly, Zairian and Zambian copper. Furthermore, one of the
indirect effects of Stabex might be that, with the general stabilization of
the production in the agricultural sectors which the system covers, shortfalls from previous bad years (since they are compensated) will not prevent
the ACPs from increasing production and more effectively competing in
United States markets. This competition could be stimulated further by
EEC financial aid. Rational regionalization, if it comes about, might also
help.
In most cases competition would be with other foreign producers of
primary products, and this might not be considered a blow to United
States interests,'90 unless increased American assistance to Latin America
is necessitated due to resultant trading losses. And at the moment it seems
rather unlikely that the Convention and the slowly growing developedcountry commitment to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for
the manufactured goods of developing countries will in the near future so
significantly increase imports into the United States of ACP manufacturers and semi-manufacturers. One unlikely impact of the Convention might
be in respect of United States imports not affected by Stabex or GSP, e.g.,
imports of iron ore from Liberia and copper from Zaire and Zambia. To
the extent that increased, cheaper, or more efficient production is stimulated by the provisions of the Convention and such increase does not all
go to the EEC, there might be increased exports to the United States-to
the possible consternation of United States iron ore and copper producers.
C.

Possible Retaliation From The United States

On balance, it would not seem that the United States as a whole will be
seriously affected by the Convention. However, sectional interests in this
country might conceive that they are injured by it. Furthermore, the current domestic economic problems of this country and the general
uncertainty in the international ecomomic order has provoked forms of
fairly extreme protectionism in United States regulation of and response
to foreign trade developments.'"' In this section we will briefly examine
several possible responses to allegations of injury to United States interests
resulting from the Convention.
Treaties of Amity and Economic Relations
The United States has not been successful in its policy of negotiating
with African countries treaties dealing with friendship, commerce and nav189.
190.
191.
2101 et

See supra notes 186 and 187.
With the possible exception of United States banana producers in Latin America.
An example is the far-reaching (in some respects) Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. §
seq. (Supp. I, Feb., 1975), some aspects of which are discussed below.
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igation, or amity and economic relations, as some of the more recent treaties are called. At the moment there are treaties only with Ethiopia and
Togo."' Both of these treaties contain provisions on trade and commerce.
As far as the EEC members are concerned, the United States has such
treaties with provisions on trade and commerce only with Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. Its treaties with Belgium,
France and Luxemburg have no such provisions.9 3 And it has no such
treaty with the United Kingdom. Typical of the provisions on trade and
9
commerce are the following provisions in the 1966 Treaty with Togo.' 1
ARTICLE IX

1. Each Party shall accord to products of the other Party, from whatever
place and by whatever type of carrier arriving, and to products destined
for exportation to the territories of such other Party, by whatever route
and by whatever type of carrier, treatment no less favorable than that
accorded like products of or destined for exportation to any third country,
in all matters relating to (a) customs duties, as well as other charges
regulations and formalities, on or in connection with importation and
exportation; and (b) internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use
2. Neither Party shall impose restrictions or prohibitions on the importation of any product of the other Party, or on the importation of any product to the territories of the other Party unless the importation of the like
product of, or the exportation of the like product to, all third countries is
similarly restricted or prohibited.
6. Each Party reserves the right to accord special advantages: (a) by
virtue of a customs union or free trade area of which it, after informing
the other Party of its plans, may become a member, or (b) to adjacent
countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic. Each Party, moreover, reserves the rights and obligations it may have under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and special advantages it may accord pursuant thereto.
As far as American imports into the ACP countries are concerned, the
Lom6 Convention does not create any difficulty, since it merely accords to
the EEC most-favored-nation treatment. Furthermore, as far as imports
into the EEC are concerned, there are virtually no American products
exported to EEC countries which compete with ACP products. In any case
paragraph six above, provides an escape mechanism, if it is correct to
192. Ethiopia, Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Sept. 7, 1951 (in force Oct. 8,
1953), [1952] 4 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864, 206 U.N.T.S. 41; Togo, Treaty of Amity and
Economic Relations, Feb. 8, 1966 (in force Feb. 5, 1967), [1966] 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No.
6193, 680 U.N.T.S. 159.
193. See E. STEIN AND P. HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 489-91 (1967).
194.

See supra note 192.
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regard the new regime created by Lomd as a customs union or a free trade
area. 19

As far as exports of Denmark, Ethiopia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands and Togo to the United States are concerned, provisions such
as those of the Togo-United States Treaty might conduce to easy entry of
products benefitting from the Convention into the United States. In that
case, the treaty provisions hardly provide this country with viable escape
mechanisms. However, common provisions like paragraph (3) of the TogoUnited States Treaty envisage the possibility of quantitative restrictions.
If either Party imposes quantitative restrictions on the importation or
exportation of any product in which the other Party has an important
interest:
(a) It shall as a general rule, give prior public notice of the total
amount of the product, by quantity or value, that may be imported or
exported during a specified period, and of any change in such amount or
period, and
(b) If it makes allotments to any third country, it shall afford such
other Party a share proportionate to the amount of the product, by quantity or value, supplied by or to it during a previous representative period,
due consideration being given to any special factors affecting the trade in
such product.' 6
Trade Act of 1974
This Act' is a continuation and extension of previous legislative developments which formerly reached their peak in the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962.'11 Among its provisions are those in title H1I11 which deal with
import relief and adjustment assistance for workers, firms and communi195. However, because of the absence of reciprocal advantage under Lome, this seems
unlikely. Cf. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIV, para. 8, 61
Stat. A66, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1948):
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single
customs territory for two or more customs territories so that (i) duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce . . .are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade . . . , and, (ii) . . . substantially the same duties and other

regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the
trade of territories not included in the union; (b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and
other restrictive regulations of commerce . . .are eliminated on substantially all
the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.
196. Togo, Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Feb. 8, 1966 (in force Feb. 5, 1967),
119661 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193, 680 U.N.T.S. 159.
197. See supra note 193.
198. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq. (1965).
199. Entitled "Relief from Injury Caused by Import Competition," 19 U.S.C.A. §2251 et
seq. (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

ties. According to section 203, import relief may consist of the following
types of Presidential action:

200

proclamation of an increase in or imposition of a duty01 on an import,
a tariff-rate quota on such article or a modification or imposition of quantitative restrictions on specified imports;
negotiation of orderly marketing agreements with foreign countries
limiting their exports to and imports into the United States of specified
products;
2
- taking a combination of such actions.0
-

Petitions for import relief may be filed by entities, including trade associations, firms, unions, groups of workers, in each case representative of
an industry. In making his determination, the President is advised by the
International Trade Commission, 20 3 which must take certain economic factors into account. 20 4 In addition to such considerations as he deems relevant, the President must bear in mind, before taking his largely discretionary action, several listed factors including
(4)

the effect of import relief on consumers

. . .

and on competition in

the domestic markets for such articles;
(9) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by taxpayers,
05
communities, and workers, if import relief were or were not provided.
Adjustment assistance for workers2 6 is unavailable unless the Secretary
of Labor has certified, in respect of a specified group of workers,
(1) that a significant number of proportion of the workers in such workers' firm or an appropriate subdivision of the firm have become totally or
partially separated, or threatened to become totally or partially separated,
(2) that sales or production, or both, of such firm or subdivision have
decreased absolutely, and
(3) that increases of imports of articles like or directly competitive with
articles produced by such workers' firm or an appropriate subdivision
200. In no case to exceed five years in duration.
201. Not to exceed 50% of existing rates.
202. 19 U.S.C.A. §2253 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
203. The new name of the Tariff Commission, changed by section 171 of the Trade Act,
19 U.S.C.A. §2231 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
204. These are set out in section 201(2) of the Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §2251 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975),
and cover, inter alia, impact on productivity and on firms, impact on industry workers and
comparative competitive position of domestic and foreign products of the same type.
205. Trade Act, section 202, 19 U.S.C.A §2252 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
206. Which can consist of limited payments of trade readjustment allowances to certain
qualifying workers; employment counseling, placement and other services; limited grants to
facilitate retraining and to facilitate job search and relocation. Trade Act sections 232, 235238, 19 U.S.C.A. §§2292, 2296-98 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
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thereof contributed to such total or partial separation, or threat thereof,
and to such decline in sales or production.M7
As to whether the import relief and worker adjustment assistance provisions will become relevant, it is difficult to estimate at this time. It should
be pointed out, however, that comparable provisions under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 were not regarded as very far-reaching in concept or
20 8
administration .
Adjustment assistance is also available to firms and communities. A
firm is only entitled to assistance if the Secretary of Commerce certifies
the same things that the Secretary of Labor has to certify in the case of
assistance to workers.0 9 On certain conditions set out in section 252 of the
Act, a firm may receive technical assistance2 10 or financial assistance in the
21 1
form of a soft SBA-type loan.
On the Secretary of Commerce's certification that an area is a "trade
impacted area ' 21 2 after an appropriate petition, adjustment assistance
benefits are to be made available in the nature of such assistance, other
than loan guarantees, as is provided to a redevelopment area under the
Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, and the guarantee
of loans for working capital and, inter alia, for acquiring, constructing and
21
expanding buildings, machinery and the like. 1
It is unclear at this time whether these two provisions of the Trade Act
will need to be invoked as a result of the Convention. With the uncertain
economic situation however, it is not impossible that they might be raised
at some time in the future. Another set of provisions in the Act are those
of title I1, dealing with relief from unfair trade practices.21 1 The Act provides in section 301 that the President can take all appropriate and feasible
steps to eliminate certain restrictive or subsidization practices and, in
particular, that he can (1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application
of or refrain from proclaiming the benefits of trade agreement concessions;
or (2) impose duties or other import restrictions on products of foreign

207. Trade Act, section 222, 19 U.S.C.A. §2272 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
208. See Note, Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Expansion Act: A Critique of
Recent Tariff Commission Decisions, 6 TEXAS INT'L L. F. 166 (1970); Comment, The Trade
Reform Act of 1973, 15 HARV.

INT'L

L.J. 126, 135-39 (1974).

209. Trade Act, 1974, section 251(c), 19 U.S.C.A. §2341 (Supp. 1, Feb., 1975).
210. 19 U.S.C.A. §2343 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
211. 19 U.S.C.A. §§2344, 2345 (Supp. 1, Feb., 1975).
212. The criteria are identical to those mentioned in section 222 of the Trade Act, 19
U.S.C.A. §2272 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975). See section 271(c), 19 U.S.C.A. §2371(c) (Supp. I, Feb.,
1975).
213. Trade Act, section 273(d), 19 U.S.C.A. §2373(d) (Supp. I, Feb., 1975). There were
no provisions for such assistance to communities in the 1962 Act.
214. 19 U.S.C.A. §2411 et seq. (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
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countries or instrumentalities.' ' These actions of the President may be
taken on a determination of discriminatory tariffs or import restrictions,
discrimination which burdens or restricts United States commerce, or,
inter alia, the existence of
subsidies (or other incentives having the effect of subsidies) on its exports
of one or more products to the United States or to other foreign markets
which have the effect of substantially reducing sales of competitive United
States product or products in the United States or in those foreign markets
216

As we indicated above, Stabex and other measures such as the guaranteed sugar purchase are not likely to have a direct impact on the United
States. However, the Trade Act at this point is so widely drawn that the
argument might well be made that Stabex and the sugar purchase guarantee in effect constitute a "subsidy" or other incentive. The main problem
is, of course, that the payment or guarantee is not made in any case by
any ACP state. Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that this draconian provision might be interpreted in a retaliatory and discriminatory fashion, if
economic conditions in this country appreciably worsen. Indeed, the other
preconditions for Presidential action might be easily manipulated adversely to the ACPs.
The intense protectiveness of the Trade Act of 1974 is underscored by
the lukewarm and highly discretionary agreement of the United States,
expressed therein, to participate in the Generalized System of Preferences.
According to title V, the President may designate a country as a "beneficiary developing country" and, in respect of "eligible articles" which are to
be listed from time to time, provide duty-free treatment.2 71 Several countries however, do not qualify to begin with. These include communist
countries, countries which have nationalized or taken certain other action
1'
without compensation against property owned by United States citizens,
countries which do not take adequate cooperative steps to prevent drug
trafficking, countries which do not recognize as binding or enforce arbitral
decisions in favor of United States citizens, countries which afford such
preferential treatment to developed country products as is likely to have a
215. 19 U.S.C.A. §2411 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975). There were no such provisions in the 1962
Act.
216. 19 U.S.C.A. §2411 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
217. In so doing, the President is to have regard for (1) the effect of such action on
furthering the economic development of developing countries, (2) the extent to which other
developed countries undertake comparable efforts and (3) the anticipated impact of such
action on U.S. producers of like or directly competitive products. Trade Act, section 501, 19
U.S.C.A. §2461 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
218. The provision is comparable to section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962,
as amended, 22 U.S.C.A. §2370(e) (Supp. 1975).
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significant adverse effect on United States commerce and countries members of OPEC or
any other arrangement of foreign countries [sic], and such country
participates in any action pursuant to such arrangement the effect of
which is to withold supplies of vital commodity resources from international trade or to raise the price of such commodities to an unreasonable
level and to cause serious disruption of the world economy . .. .21
As far as the Lom Convention is concerned, it does not as such disqualify any party from GSP treatment.2 0 It will be remembered that Lom6
abolishes the requirement for the ACPs to give reverse preferences to the
EEC. In one respect, however, the GSP provisions of the 1974 Act might
disentitle some of the ACPs from qualifying. The Act provides that among
the reasons for revoking an order designating a country as a beneficiary
country are Presidential determinations that (1) the country has exported
during a calendar year "an appraised value in excess of an amount which
bears the same ratio to $25,000,000 as the gross national product of the
United States for the preceding year, bears to the gross national of the
United States for the calendar year 1974" or (2) the country has exported
during any calendar year "a quantity of any eligible article equal to or
exceeding 50 percent of the appraised value of the total imports of such
2
article into the United States." 1
As the preceding section will have demonstrated, none of the ACPs
presently appears to be such a major supplier to this country. Nevertheless, the 50% rule is highly undesirable, due to the fact that many developing countries are essentially mono-product countries. The GNP formula,
however, is even more reprehensible in view of the extreme uncertainty of
the times. With its flexibility it in effect constitutes a harsh, arbitrary and
inequitable penalty against certain countries, some of which might be the
beneficiaries of the Stabex, the sugar guarantee or the trade liberalization
provisions of the Convention.
Countervailing Duties: Tariff Act 1930
Section 303 of the Tariff Act 22 authorizes the levy and obliges the payment of a duty, the countervailing duty, to be assessed by Secretary of the
Treasury in the following circumstances:
Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political
subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or cor219. Trade Act section 502, 19 U.S.C.A. §2462 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
220. Of course, Nigeria is an important member of OPEC and therefore would tend to
run afoul of the provision.
221. Trade Act, section 504(c), 19 U.S.C.A. §2464(c) (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
222. 19 U.S.C.A. §1303 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975).
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poration, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant
upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony,
province, or other political subdivision of government, . . . upon the importation of such article or merchandise into the United States, whether
the same shall be imported in the same condition as when exported from
the country of production or has been changed in condition by remanufac-

ture or otherwise ....

223

The duty is payable by the importer and consists of "the net amount of
such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed. ' 2 Despite
the fact that this provision has not been frequently used in the past, it is
significant that, in a time of economic hardship and intense protectiveness,
the section has been recently amended by the Trade Act of 1 9 7 4 .11 What
is interesting is that the Congress at that time declined to tighten up the
section in one of its weakest places: its omission clearly to impose a
criterion of injury for the duty to be exigible. In fact, the amendment now
makes it clear that domestic injury is unnecessary in most cases, since it
introduces the imposition of duties in cases where the article or merchandise is duty free. But there must be an affirmative determination by the
International Trade Commission that "an industry in the United States
is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established,
by reason of the importation of such article or merchandise into the United

States

....

",226

Because of the somewhat loose wording of the section, it is not unlikely
that it might be argued that the Stabex and sugar guarantee provisions of
the Convention constitute bounties or grants. In an early case, the Supreme Court defined these words as follows:
If the word "bounty" has a limited sense the word "grant" has not. A word
of broader significance than "grant" could not have been used. Like its
synonyms "give" and "bestow," it expresses a concession, the conferring
of something by one person upon another. And if the something be conferred by a country "upon the exportation of any article or merchandise"
2
a countervailing duty is required. 2
The cases and authoritative discussions to date suggest that, inter alia,
the section is or might be applicable in such situations: currency retention
223. The words in italics were added by section 331 of the 1974 Trade Act.
224. In other words, it is intended to be the exact amount by which the article or merchandise benefited abroad. This usually is a very difficult matter to determine.
225. The Act actually adds a similar, harsher provision, discussed in the text, supra at
note 216.
226. Trade Act of 1974, section 331.
227. Nicholas and Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 39, 39 S.Ct. 218, 220, 63 L.Ed. 461,
465 (1919). The court was construing an earlier, comparable provision.
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schemes involving a bonus on exports, provision by governments of direct
subsidies to exporters (including export loss indemnification), excessive
duty remissions, certain trading by state trading enterprises, tax benefits
accorded to export industries, export financing and export insurance
schemes, production subsidies (at least where exporting of the products is
envisaged) and tax rebates on exportation."'
These applications and suggested applications suggest that the words
are capable of having a very far-reaching meaning. In that event, it might
well be that a protectionist minded Secretary could take in effect seriously
retaliatory action in ths situations we are here discussing. Of course, it is
evident that the Stabex money is not paid by any single EEC country, and,
if the EEC is considered a "person, partnership, association, cartel or
corporation," it is not making the payment upon manufacture, production
or export "in such country," to use the slightly confusing language of the
section. Besides, Stabex payments are not, strictly speaking, made "upon"
production or export. Furthermore, the same strictures largely apply to
such an assault on the sugar guarantee scheme, especially since the price
often might be below the world market price. Nevertheless, the expansive
interpretation which has been given at times to the provision must be
borne in mind 2 9 and it has been stated that
There is no reason why subsidies granted by the EEC or other supranational entities should not be subject to the countervailing duty law
upon the import of goods from one of the member states, even though
the government of that state does not itself directly provide the subsidy.
It may be that the law as written is broad enough to cover such circumstances .... 238
It is hoped that the basic principle of free trade, which has hitherto been
thought to underlie United States international economic relations, will
not be subverted by fantastic, or even occasionally faithful, interpretations
and applications of domestic legislation."2 '
228. See Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue
in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82 (1968-69); Berry, The Countervailing Duty in
International Trade-A Legal Analysis, 28 FED. B.J. 329 (1968); Feller, Mutiny Against the
Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, And the Resurgence of the
Countervailing Duty Law, 1 L. & POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 17 (1969).
229. See Butler, supra note 228.
230. Feller, supra note 228 at 65-66. An interesting question is whether re-exports
(whether or not further reworked within the EEC) would arguably come within section 303.
231. See also the Anti-dumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C.A. §§160-73 (Supp. I, Feb., 1975)
as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, section 321, and the discussion of it by Conner and
Buschlinger, The United States Antidumping Act: A Timely Survey, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 117
(1966-67).

